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Abstract
Functionalism avoids a potentially fatal innite regress by realising the low level
phenomena of mind in mere Turing machines rather than via undischarged homuncul.
Adopting a narrow, logical view of such mechanisms has led to two sorts of problems: ex-
ponentially intractable models of human inferential competence; and a wide divergence
between the supposed competence and observable human performance. These problems
have produced a retreat to instrumentalism about folk psychological concepts|a retreat
that has long been trumpeted by certain philosophers.
We argue that abandoning hope in this way is premature. The problems arise from
two quarters: an impoverished notion of competence models that divorce them too far
from performance models; and too narrow a view of possible functional mechanisms.
We explore the consequences of retaining a traditional view of inference, while adopting
a new mechanism for memory. We motivate the latter by developing a seemingly unna-
tural picture of von Neumann machines, taking their nite memory seriously. Together,
the two repairs suce to make instrumentalism avoidable.
1 Introduction
Functionalism derives its explanatory force from its rm grounding in the certainties of
Turing machines (TMs) and their practical approximations, the von Neumann machines
(vNMs). One branch of cognitive psychology, and its philosophical stablemate, has taken
this doctrine seriously, and coupled it with some of the basic notions of folk psychology such
as beliefs, desires, hopes, etc. Most of the theories are wedded rather rmly to these archi-
tectures, with all their connotations of logicality. They therefore face problems explaining
the apparent illogicality and obvious tractability of human cognition. In desperation, some
functionalists, whilst naturally retaining the Turing metaphor at the heart of their theories,
have been forced to abandon these folk psychological constructs. The switch is either to
instrumentalism, proposing that these constructs are not causal in producing behaviour but
are still useful for explaining or predicting it [4], or else to a more radical position, holding
that they are not even satisfactory for that [23].

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Connectionism, for all its many faults, gives the rst hint that something may be wrong
with this retreat. It demonstrates that, despite essential computational equivalence, the
strict analogy with TMs that has survived into vNMs is not the only way of conceiving of
the functional mechanisms of thought. Furthermore, on broadening the range of possible
mechanisms, it becomes apparent that too simplistic a notion of human competence is po-
tentially dangerous. Unfortunately, connectionism seems rather remote architecturally and
representationally from high level psychological entities, so some independent motivation
behind alternative functional mechanisms is required.
Section 2 works through some of the reasoning behind instrumentalism, involving such pro-
blems as virtual beliefs and inferential tractability, and discusses certain conditions under
which the instrumentalist retreat may be avoidable. Section 3 sketches out a view of func-
tionalist mechanisms that satises these conditions. Section 4 concludes that the case for
abandoning folk psychology, an unattractive move in the absence of a viable alternative, is
not yet proven.
2 Competence, Performance and Virtual Belief
The process of `systematising' folk psychology involves constructing a functionalist tableau
around its basic entities such as beliefs and desires, and its basic notions of how they
interact. In cartoon form, one such notion might be `if person A believes that doing B will
result in C, and desires that C, then, all else being equal, A will do B'. Folk psychology is
not systematic in any functionalist sense, and does not concern itself with mechanism or
the causal ecacy or otherwise of its entities.
The overall tableaux most commonly suggested involve sentential belief boxes and desire
boxes containing the beliefs and desires respectively, together with central processors that
execute the `rules'. Although this is but a crude sketch, it has two key features that are
common to most such postulations: the one-by-one consideration of the folk psychological
entities; and the variously expressed commitment to some variety of logic for the rule
processing. As hinted above, both of these are strongly associated with the traditional view
of the vNM.
It is important to remember that one cannot attack all systematisations by merely attacking
one. In fact, the ongoing debate about folk psychology between Stich [23], Dennett [5],
Fodor [9], and many others, is conducted solely about the kind of model just outlined.
Opponents of the Language of Thought (LoT) type doctrine point to various aws and
apparent absurdities in the inferences it suggests. They then either reject folk psychology
totally, or else suggest that its ecacy is merely approximate, and that its entities are not
real, extant and causal, but merely abstract calculating devices with which one can predict
behaviour. The former view seems a little churlish given that folk psychology seems on
the face of it to be the only theory that has any predictive power. The latter view is at
root unattractive since it is not accompanied by any compelling alternative causal entities.
However, if the problems for folk psychology suggested by Dennett and others are indeed
damaging in the way posited, instrumentalism would be the only course open. We shall
proceed by establishing and examining the framework within which the objections are cast.
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2.1 Competence and Incompetence
The rst objection comes from a concern about the mechanistic relevance of Chomskian
[2] competence theory rather than a performance theory. On the one hand, there is the
competence of the undistracted, resource-unlimited ideal thinker. On the other, there is the
performance of distracted, error-prone real thinkers. Dennett (1987:76) has emphasised the
signicance of the correct choice of competence model for psychological theorising. If we
get the competence model badly wrong, any performance model based on it will be full of
artefactual results and ad hoc mechanisms. Poor results with this performance model will
tend to reect back on the competence model. Dennett says that:
The fact about competence models that provokes my \instrumentalism" is that
the decomposition of one's competence model into parts, phases, states, steps
or whatever need shed no light at all on the decomposition of actual mechanical
parts, phases, states, or steps of the system being modeled|even when the
competence model is, as a competence model, excellent. [Dennett 1987:76]
Any competence model that suggests that human reasoning is fundamentally logical runs up
against problems such as those from human conditional reasoning. In some tasks [20, 14],
97% of humans fail to satisfy the logical idealisation, so the LoT might in fact rather be
called an Incompetence model. This is not in itself destructive of the LoT, since it is always
possible to multiply entities to save the phenomena. Further arguments below about virtual
belief are more persuasive.
It is important to realise that the truth of the quotation and the unpalatable facts about
logical reasoning are not arguments against all possible systematised folk psychology, only
against the LoT version. Of course, competence theories may say nothing about perfor-
mance mechanisms, but that does not absolve them from empirical and theoretical study.
If, as in the case of purely logical inference, incompetence is found to be rife, and further-
more achieving competence is known to be computationally intractable, it follows that the
competence model is incorrect. Note also a possible lacuna made apparent by this; if the
competence model is too far divorced from performance, it is useless even for instrumental
theorising, since its predictions will be invalid.
2.2 Virtual Belief
Dennett does not reject the LoT view on account of conditional reasoning data. He prefers
rather to look at the more complex case of virtual beliefs. They provide an interesting test
case in view of the alternative explanation available from the memory machine picture that
will be established in Section 3.
When describing what someone believes, we can distinguish at least three signicantly
dierent cases. Take Neil. He believes that Margaret is Prime Minister. No doubt he also
believes that 30001 > 30000. And we judge, watching him play chess, that he believes that
you should get the queen out early. In making these ascriptions, we have traded on three
dierent kinds of belief. The belief about Margaret is probably something that Neil has
actively considered and has stored (after the 1987 general election, perhaps). As such, it
is perhaps an explicit belief. The belief about the numbers he probably never entertained
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before, but would assent to immediately if asked. It's something that his other beliefs,
about numbers and arithmetic, commit him to. Indeed, it could perhaps be inferred, via a
laborious logical proof, from what he explicitly believes. Let's call this an implicit belief.
Given this ostensive denition, it should be obvious that Neil is committed to an innite
number of such implicit beliefs. Finally, his belief about chess is something he has never
entertained before, that he might not admit, and perhaps cannot infer from his explicit
beliefs. It too is implicit in the way he behaves. But to distinguish it from the second
case, let us call it an emergent belief. Implicit and emergent beliefs are sometimes known
as virtual beliefs.
Now, if we assume the LoT model of inferential behaviour, we must constrain our theorising
about possible performance models to be compatible with both the competence model, and
with some of the hard facts about explicit and virtual belief. Since reasoning is fundamen-
tally logical, but humans rarely seem to believe all the consequences of their beliefs, it is
tempting to build a performance model of reasoning along the following lines.
Explicit beliefs form a core library of axioms. A logical inference device, commonly called
the Extrapolator-Deducer (XD), derives implicit beliefs from these axioms by applying the
internal rules of inference [9, 4]. If you ask Neil about the number 30001, he will be able to
derive the belief in question very rapidly. Emergent beliefs don't quite t into this picture,
and proposals have been made that they are not really represented, either statically (as
explicit beliefs) or on demand (as implicit beliefs), but are really \there" as properties of
the architecture of the belief retrieval system eg [16].
This is a performance model made in hell. Various problems with it are well-known. The
XD must have its own stock of beliefs in order to know which beliefs to use in deduction.
The power of the XD will vary from person to person. The number of infererence steps the
XD can take in (say) 100ms is arbitrarily xed at (say) 15|but we can't tell which logical
system the XD is using. There are some implicit beliefs that the XD should be able to
infer that it can't, and vice versa. Further, it is really not at all obvious that an account
of emergent beliefs can be grafted onto the XD. In what sense does the \Get the queen out
early" belief reside in the activity of the XD?
Dennett expresses these problems with performance models of virtual belief eectively in
his description of a machine designed to get jokes about Newfoundlanders. He supplies a
joke (but attributes it to Pylyshyn), and lists various propositions we have to believe if
we're to get the joke, and states:
Not only do these beliefs not \come to mind" : : : , but it is also highly implausible
to suppose that each and every one of them is consulted, independently, by a
computational mechanism designed to knit up the lacun in the story by a
deductive generation process. : : :The list of beliefs gives us a good general
idea of the information that must be in the head, but if we view it as a list of
axioms from which a derivational procedure deduces the \point of the joke," we
may have the sketch of a performance model, but it is a particularly ill-favored
performance model. [Dennett 1987:77]
Following this argument leaves only two options to those who insist on rejecting all syste-
matised folk psychology on the basis of the performance inadequacies of the LoT; one can
either retain folk psychology (and a fortiori its entities such as belief) as an instrumental,
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non-causal, theory, or one can reject it altogether. A third option, which is followed below,
is to suggest an alternative systematisation.
It bears notice that Dennett's preferred option, the rst of the above, involves a certain
prestidigitation. If folk psychology is to be useful to us in predicting and explaining other
people's behaviour, we must have a way of using their assertions of beliefs and desires
appropriately. If the theory is so incoherent, intractable, or implausible, that these entities
cannot be implicated in causing the behaviour, how can they be implicated in explaining
or predicting it? Dennett also faces criticism from the radical anti-folk psychologists such
as Stich [23], who argue that having rejected causality, to retain beliefs and desires etc in
explaining behaviour is like explaining planetary motion in terms of Ptoleman epicycles
whilst rejecting their entire basis.
Ruling systematised folk psychology out of court is a fundamentally unattractive course,
since there is no equally predictive, let alone better, replacement. Such a move can be avoi-
ded if some alternative XD theory can be developed, particularly one that has independent
motivation. This is the aim of the next section.
3 Altered States
In searching for new and fruitful analogies with which to extend and defend their models of
cognition, functionalists continually nd their writhing room limited by fundamental Tu-
ring equivalence. Despite the possibilities of re-implementation and simulation of one such
computational system by another, properties that have natural explanations in the one may
seem mysterious in the other. By applying, and then extending, one such transformation,
we will attempt to demonstrate this constructively, and to produce a model of memory that
can be used in an alternate extrapolator-deducer theory.
The obvious evolutionary path from the TM architecture to the vNM architecture is to
leave unchanged the nature and ro^le of the central processor (the reader) and its states,
but to regard the memory of the vNM as a nite tape. Arbitrary locations on this virtual
tape can be accessed in O(1) rather than O(N) time, where N is its virtual length. The
ability easily to write to, or read from, arbitrary locations makes a vNM considerably
easier to program than a TM, and the (almost) size-independent read/write times, makes
a large class of algorithms computationally feasible. However, the recent debate pitting
Reduced Instruction Set (RISC) against Complex Instruction Set (CISC) microprocessors
points to an obvious trade o that, as described, is rather hidden in the detail of Turing
universality. Specically, there is a balance between the complexity of the set of states and
state transitions of the central processor on the one hand, and the complexity and length
of the programs that perform a task, on the other.
Since the memory of a vNM is nite, one can take this view on complexity further. We can
draw the `state versus tape' boundary around not only the central processor, but also some
or all of the memory. Under the new description, states represent not only the contents
of the internal ags and registers of the microprocessor, but also the entire contents of
memory|roughly, all the transistors that comprise the operation of the machine. This new
description is precisely that of the entire computer as a nite state machine (FSM), which of
course is exactly what its nite memory permits it to be. State transitions are instigated just
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as before by the operation of the central processor, but now the state transition diagram
is extremely rich and complex. The way that von Neumann machines are designed has
the eect of enforcing what might be described as locality in this state transition diagram.
That is, if the states were `ordered' in an appropriate way,
1
most of the possible next states
themselves would be local.
The new complexity and richness of the set of states and state transition diagram in this
alternative viewpoint accounts for the infrequency of its adoption. But it is precisely the
attraction for us. The distinctions between program and storage appear considerably ero-
ded, and we will go on to erode them even further. Note that at this stage this is only an
alternative perspective of exactly the same machine, which is condemned to traverse exactly
the same states and execute in the same way exactly the same programs.
Various key properties of computation look very dierent on this alternative picture of the
vNM, particularly symbolic representation and the potentially holistic inuence of memory.
What could previously be identied as separate contents of memory can only be found,
if at all, in the labels of a whole set of states; and the labels, of course, have no causal
ro^le in engendering the behaviour of the system. It is therefore no longer even sensible
to try to isolate out particular symbol structures stored at particular places in memory,
or to determine the nature and provenance of their logical eects. The symbol processing
properties of the whole machine are entirely emergent from the dynamics of the simple low
level entities.
In addition, the whole of memory is wrapped up in a state, so moving from one state to
another could correspond to a radical change in its entire contents. Of course, the vNM
architecture prevents such transitions from happening. Memory is like tape, inviolate except
serially. A rational explanation for this severe constraint is that such radical changes are
potentially dangerous in the absence of any well-founded method of policing them. However,
dierent mechanisms for state transition need not necessarily labour under such constraints.
Removing another such bar could allow the whole contents of memory not only to be
changed by such a state transition, but also to determine which state transition occurs.
This new picture naturally encompasses a much richer theory of the interaction between
memory and inference, mediated in a complex fashion by the hardware of the machine. It
would also appear to be more commensurable with the views on cognition of Maturana and
Varela [18]. They consider the nervous system less as a machine responding as a program
to a set of inputs with a set of outputs, and more as a system whose states and dynamical
state transitions are aected by all its components. Some of these will have characteristics
partly determined by events in the external world.
We do not have, and indeed to respond to Dennett do not need, a sophisticated picture of
how to develop from the above picture a complete XD. The naive mechanism which will
suce may best be imagined as some form of PROLOG system whose inferences are executed
on one computer, but whose database and short term memory are stored on another. The
rst requests rules and facts from the second, and demands that changes be made in the
light of its inferences. Although continuing to view the rst computer, the inference engine,
in a traditional way, though not of course as a PROLOG machine, we will investigate the
1
By the `invisible' values of the program counter, the registers and ags, the possible values of the memory
location pointed to by that program counter and then all the other possible values of all the other memory
locations.
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consequences of considering alternative mechanisms underlying the function of the second
computer, the memory machine, by further developing the above picture. This general view
of the relationship between memory and inference in an XD has a number of defenders, eg
Anderson [1].
Consider now the memory machine (MM). Under a traditional description it would contain
symbols, and would be searched (subject to a request from the inference engine) according to
some criteria, such as `nd a script containing doctors', or `what is the capital of France?',
or the like. Under the new description, the answers to such queries can be determined
from the state the MM occupies, and its own searching procedure for nding the required
information can be seen in the set of states traversed. However, on this picture, it is natural
to contemplate altering the hardware of the machine, the complex system that applies the
rules for moving from one state to another, and consequently changing the whole modus
operandi and output of the MM.
One such change is to consider the states as the local minima of some function (perhaps an
energy function, for want of a better term), and the state transitions as movements from
one local minimum to another (cf [13, 10]). The hardware can be considered as moving
the system around the energy surface, according to its principles, landing up in states at
the local minima. Learning changes the energy surface so as to alter either the minima, or
the traversable paths from one minimum to another, and consequently the states actually
entered ( the memories recalled) by the MM under given conditions. This, as advertised,
licenses state transitions other than those allowed by the vNM. Now, the whole contents of
memory are causally implicated in every move.
The appeal of making this change is that it's much easier to see how to build a human-
like memory (if not actually to do so). Contextual exibility, associational memory, and
inferential error, can all be given natural explanations on this model. Of course, we are not
able to specify either the energy function, or the mechanisms that are sensitive to it, but
in that respect we are no worse o than other functionalists, and need only demonstrate
possible Fodorian `oating straws'.
The evolutionary sequence has been as follows. First we had the Turing machine. Then we
had the von Neumann machine as the implementation of a nite TM. Then we had the vNM
as a nite state machine. And nally we reached alternative mechanisms for state transition
in a FSM, and consequently alternative state transitions. This motivates and locates a
(connectionist) dynamical picture of the mechanisms of mind. It also neatly demonstrates
the diculties connectionists are bound to have in talking about symbolic representation
in their models. Even when we know that the symbols are explicitly emergent, as in the
FSM description of the vNM, they are elusive, to say the least.
We have previously [3] linked related notions of local maximisation (reversing the sign)
with those of Elster [7], Doyle [6], and Simon [21]. Very briey, the suggestion was that
global maximisation based on predictions of the future, which Elster claims to be criterial
for rationality, is too dicult for mere machines (including us) in interesting domains.
However, not all local maxima are as high as others, and one can understand Simon's
satiscing, and consequently Doyle's ideas of rational psychology as utility maximisation,
in these terms. These maxima are actually on a longer and larger scale than the ones on
which we concentrate in this paper, since here, the local maxima just dene the raw material
for the inference engine. However, large scale global maximisation cannot be based on small
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scale local maximisation, which is the basis for our claim about the diculty.
It is worth very briey comparing the possible alternative views on representation. Symbols
can vary on two dimensions: hard versus soft, and active versus passive. Hard symbols
are like those to be found on a tape of a TM, in the memory of a vNM, or indeed in the
localist models of Hofstadter [11, 12] or Feldman and Ballard [8]. They are hard in the
sense that their semantic (and usually syntactic) boundaries are xed at `compile' time
and do not vary during the course of a computation. Soft symbols are more like those of
distributed connectionist models, or (hopefully) the emergent symbols of the MM described
above. Their mutual semantic boundaries vary in a context-dependent way, and indeed
are usually learnt during the operation of the system. The distinction between passive and
active symbols is rather less precise, since it gets unhelpfully entangled with the dierences
between declarative and procedural representations. Passive symbols are like those in a
typical frame-type system [19], in that they are more `processed over' than `processing'
entities. Active symbols are just the reverse, as in Hoftstadter's uid concepts or the
holistic MM above. Adequate context-dependency and learning seem to require soft, active
symbols, since all attempts at passive symbols seem to falter on the former criterion, and
hard ones on the latter.
This section has attempted to motivate a signicant move away from the traditional model
of computation by taking seriously the obvious fact that a von Neumann machine has only
nite memory. The reconceptualisation involved can lead to an architecture where states
are actually large dimensional vectors upon which soft symbols are emergent, and whose
state transitions correspond to movements along some form of energy surface dened by the
interactions between the various components in the system. The hard symbols of Turing
machine tapes and the active symbols of Hofstadter's and Feldman and Ballard's models
are both rejected.
We are now in a position to evaluate the consequences for the behaviour of the overall XD,
like Dennett's joke-getting system. We have changed the functioning of the MM, which
of course stores both the rules consulted by the IM, and the memories used in executing
the rules. The contextual exibility built into the MM derives from the implication of the
entire contents of memory in state transitions. Even in the naive picture which has only
those entities \come to mind" that are passed from the MM to the IM, it is apparent that
the implicit Newfoundlander-joke beliefs that gave Dennett so much trouble need never be
passed into the IM. Instead, they can be causally implicated in the overall XD process by
helping determine which consciously `observable' beliefs are selected during the non von
Neumann search.
Implicit beliefs generally gain a more natural explanation on this picture, since an in-
tractable search amongst rules or memories is not necessary. Indeed, explanations can be
imagined for more complex cocktails of repressed beliefs and their apparent eects in terms
of modications to the energy surface determining the search. Of course, this story is in-
complete in the absence of an exact specication of the requisite `all-singing, all-dancing'
state-transition system, but work on connectionist memory systems demonstrates at least
its potential feasibility, and that is all that is required.
Oberlander and Dayan 9
4 Conclusions
In endorsing functionalism, it has traditionally been too easy to adopt a narrow view of
computational mechanisms. The fact that two architectures may be equivalent in the Turing
sense does not imply that the functional properties that can naturally be ascribed to one
can naturally be ascribed to the other. Attempts to systematise folk psychology based on
the narrow, logical, view have failed. they have failed because of the obvious illogicality and
tractability of human reasoning, and because of the implausibility of the inferences which
the narrow view insists on. Instrumentalists with the same narrow view of mechanism
conclude from this failure that the entities and notions of folk psychology are inherently
wrong, and that all they can do is provide an abstract, non-realistic, tool for computation.
An alternative conclusion is that it is not the entities and notions of folk psychology that
are at fault. It is their particular systematisation under the narrow view. A broader
perspective can be adopted, one that can be motivated directly by two moves. First, we
draw an alternative boundary between the central processing unit and the memory of a von
Neumann machine regarded in nite state terms. Secondly, we modify slightly the state
transition rules. Instrumentalism was at best unattractive because of its non-causal entities.
With richer functional mechanism to hand, we can now reject it as an unnecessary evil.
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